This paper argues that Russia's choice of economic organization, which is based on the renewed role of the state, is a response to the existence of severe transaction costs, and subsequent mitigation of contractual incompleteness in the absence of a strong proper ty -ness classes in Russia, reducing the necessity for appropriate market infrastructure. This also implied that if Russia's political and economic system had more than one competing hierarchy, the objective of the elites would not have entailed long-term economic growth, as gains from short-term wealth tunneling would have been much larger. As in and long-term to maturity, under a weak legal system a new substitute governing mechanism, which took form of the state-private co-partnership system, has arisen in order to reduce hold-up costs leading to high levels of underinvestment.
Introduction
A sharp turnaround in laissez-faire policies of the 1990s under the new regime in the beginning of the new millennium resulted in a renewed political control -2003 Table 1 . In period 1 the otherwise revoprivate property and introducing central planning (Ericson, 1991) . The strategy was somewhat successful in promoting capital and total factor productivity growth 1 ), until
The perestroika (period 2) experimented with market-oriented policies, in order -allowed private ownership in non-strategic economic sectors such as services, -tion proved unsuccessful due to the predatory behavior of local bureaucrats. As is in the de facto ownership of shares by former state enterprise insiders (Alexeev, where it considered they were most needed (as predicted by Trotsky, 1925) . The regime also set all managerial salaries (Leeman, 1963). Ross, 2004) . In the 1990s, the regions also gained de facto power and the period saw the emergence of regional bureaucrats (Robinson, 2002) . They exploited the existing regional differences in new policy proposals, such as public spending, own wealth tunneling objectives. At the same time, shock therapy led to hyperin--ure to generate economic growth, it was unsurprising for the incoming politi--pletely abolish the free market approach in that all prices and output quantities, except that in a few strategic industries, were allowed to be determined by initiative, it opted to form co-partnerships with private investors.
to restore the state's governing status, while also promoting a certain degree to the motivation behind government's continuous intervention in Russian Others adopt Locke's approach and consider government interference to be harmfor a natural evolution of property rights. In this paper, I argue that the function of the state is highly dependent on the country's entrenched customs and traditions, political rule, and subsequently, its legal developments.
For instance, one of the most widely accepted arguments against state's involvement in economic affairs is that delegation of power to the government is often not matched by its credible commitments to other players. In their famous work, th century England, where the revenue-seeking Crown continually dishonored its contractual conformities, and was subsequently stripped of its monopoly decision-making power to allocate funds. The ruling power of the Crown was replaced by political institutions, which enforced ex post contractual agreements. The new redistribution of control resulted in the emergence of greater political and civil freedom, as well as the ability of the sovereign to credibly commit to protecting private property rights. The success of these new institutions is linked to England's economic development. exist had the Crown had an army to suppress the opposition. More importantly, the new hierarchies (the Parliament, the Whigs, etc.) did not operate in a country legal charter, which was originally issued in 1215, revealed certain individual rights which were bounded by law.
No Freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his Freehold, or Liberties, or the free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed… We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right.
(Clause 29, Magna Carta 1215)
In other words, the concept of private property rights was not unfamiliar to -tial gains to be made from long-term commitment, and wealth expropriation by the Crown was seen as a hindrance to achieving economic prosperity.
characterized by strong protection of property rights, to the federalism system, which allowed the states to have the power to supply their citizens with public that such restrictions were made credible by a combination of formal institutions and informal norms that regulated the behavior of economic agents.
Market-preserving federalism was the product of a historical process resulting in a strong consensus supporting these limits…and rested on the fact that the vast majority of the population consistently favored policies and parties limiting the federal government and protecting economic rights. (Weingast, 1995, p. 26) mercantile early modern Europe, North (1991) drew attention to the evolution rights, facilitating trade and investment. North believed that the increasing enforceability of contracts, a process which was aided by an improving legal sysbeginnings and the differences in resolutions that it had with both the common be contrasted to that of the above. In Russia, traditional authoritarian rule continuously impeded the development of a strong legal system.
Lawyers! What is the use of so many? I have only two in my whole empire, and I mean to hang one of them as soon as I return.
Russia, reducing the necessity for appropriate market infrastructure. The persistent absence of the necessary prerequisites for a market economy also implied that if Russia's political and economic system had more than one competing hierarchy, such as truculent members of the lower classes of bureaucracy, the objective of the elites would not have entailed long-term economic growth, for the gains from short-term wealth siphoning would have been much larger. Indeed, for early as the mid-16 th century, the ruling dynasty believed that the oligarchy was undermining Russia's economic progress, subsequently implement-of the lower state bureaucracy, many of whom were known as boyars (Raeff, 1962) . The latter remained locked in protecting their feudal privileges, and therefore opposed the introduction of western-style, commercially dominated cities, while suspecting that new economic reforms were incompatible with the survival of the old empire. The tradition of centrally imposing commercial revoluindustrialization. Once again, modernizing reforms were rigorously opposed by and Illiash, 2009).
of several competing hierarchies operating in an environment without clearlymake long-term commitments and invest into their corporations. In the absence of supporting institutions, it was far more lucrative to engage in asset-stripping -siderable political and economic power, competed rigorously with each other for resources, eroding the nation's wealth at an even faster rate (for example, Ponzi Tompson, 2005).
The political regime of the 2000s
With Vladimir Putin coming to power, the central government focused on remaining 1990s business elites were expected to fully cooperate with the state's economic objectives and assist in Kremlin's domestic and foreign policy initiatives (Aris and Marshall, 2004) . At that time, many scholars drew attention to the rise of the new elite. Siloviki, who were seen as Putin's trusted men and represented security service and law enforcement veterans, became the pillar of the new administration. They were placed on company boards, particularly in industries of national importance, in order to enforce the regime's policies and to safeguard company assets. In contrast to the oligarchs, siloviki exercised their power through managerial positions rather than ownership. They saw their role as to reverse problems created by the oligarchs, reintroduce hierarchical loyalThis paper adopts the view that siloviki merely served as a conduit for the central government, through which the new policies were channelled. In addition, I highlight the fact that although after a brief experiment with laissez-faire policies Russia was once again drawn to its long-standing tradition of authoritarian rule, the new regime did not revert an effective partner with private investors. It aimed to promote long-run ecoand private investment funds. The government recognized that in the absence of that would result in underinvestment, if the state did not introduce some effective substitute.
The next section introduces two related hypotheses. First, it is proposed that given a persistently weak legal environment, the central state did not allow com---ed corporate growth by encouraging private agents' operations through a combination of free-market and state-mandated policies, but also induced severe on restoring order and protecting national economy from the elites' concentrated economic and political power.
hold-up costs, but also bigger international scandals, the state chose to form state-private co-partnership systems with private investors. In this partnership, avert rent-seeking behavior from the outset, thus minimizing misappropriation property rights.
The punishment strategy and the state-private co-partnership system

The Stackelberg game between the central state and private decision-makers
This section outlines a model adopted by the central state in order to enforce contractual compliance of private decision-makers. The model can discourage short-term rent-seeking behavior by allowing the state to execute punishment if a decision-maker chooses to pursue wealth tunneling objectives. It is argued that the model was developed in response to the legacy of previous regime's reforms, which empowered the rising elite to take advantage of an open but weak political system and use their ill-gotten wealth to buy media coverage, as well as state of--tection of investment funds. It knows that, due to a poor legal system, the laws may not be effectively enforced. The government also acknowledges that a priignore the law if the expected return from short-term wealth tunneling is higher than that from a long-term investment commitment strategy. Therefore, the state develops a punishment strategy, which it imposes on private decision-makers if they do not conform to the implemented policy. If the penalty is severe, it is in the best interests of a private decision-maker to conform. the state can achieve is represented by , while the corresponding payoff to a private decision-maker is (1-s) /n is also unattainable, as it can only be accomplished by not inducing a punishment mechanism, with private agents still credibly committing to honor their contractual obligations and not adoptm ((1-s) /n) , where m . The state anticipates such opportunistic behavior, and introduces a punishment strategy at cost c in the initial period. The cost of punishment leaves the state with a reduced -c, yet one can see that the outcome -c, ((1-s)( -c)) /n is the only a punishment strategy already in place, private agents will create an even smaller
Perhaps the most apparent example of this game was the prosecution of the head accused of engaging in extensive asset-stripping, as well as using his position to bribe local bureaucrats. The federal government placed Khodorkovsky under arthat Kremlin will not be challenged by the elite, who became accustomed to fusing their political and economic power (practice that western institutions vetoed since the 1920s). Other oligarchs, who were subjected to similar fate included Fig. 1 . between the state and a private decision-makerand Russian Public Television. In an attempt to cement his power over the Russian --nalled that the only way for the oligarchs to participate in economic transactions the rules of the game. Evidence suggests that Kremlin allowed several oligarchs to maintain their empires as long as their behavior did not disrupt the state's Roman Abramovich still controlled metal mining empires, but they had to adhere to certain conditions imposed by the state (such as Abramovich selling his major had to become servants, as opposed to competitors, or opponents of the regime (Lavelle, 2004) . Now consider what happens when private decision-makers become leaders agents can attain their maximum payoff of m ((1-s) /n -with a much reduced payoff of , and represents a weakened government, which
From the outcomes produced above, one can see that in the absence of strong property rights, it is socially optimal to re-establish the state as the market leader , Fig. 2. between the state and a private decision-maker.
because such organizational structure can better secure long-term investment funds. The government is able to place constraints on private decision-makers and thereby limit their abilities to engage in short-term predatory behavior by forcing them to conform to state's anti-expropriation policies. This approach enables the state to obtain its maximum attainable payoff (which also corresponds
The co-partnership between the state and private investors
makers ameliorates rent-seeking, one must also draw attention to c, or cost of implementing punishment. The government has to spend substantial resources to monitor the behavior of private decision-makers, as well as absorb the cost of investment scandals. For instance, there were numerous reports referring to con-2003), especially if these companies belonged to industries of national interest, internationally-condemned business environment, which deterred global inves--change for stability and growth.
policy, I argue that the central state often opted to create a direct partnership with From the theoretical perspective, Russia's choice of economic organization is a response to the existence of severe transaction costs and to subsequent mitigation of contractual incompleteness in the absence of a strong property rights -stitute, one ex ante expects high hold-up costs, and high hold-up costs lead to a high level of underinvestment, particularly in strategic economic sectors, which -expect a rapid emergence of an appropriate legal system, which can assure pridustries a second-best corporate governance mechanism has arisen in the form of the state-private co-ownership system, which can act to monitor the behavior of corporate insiders and constrain their wealth tunneling objectives until Russia develops a secure property rights system. the 2000s eschewed renationalization of enterprises and instead increased its stake in corporate equity from 20 percent to just under 40 percent between 2003 -ment control over the country's largest enterprises. Above all, the state targeted the state to collect energy sector rents, while offering investors their expect-2009). It is reported that over 40 percent of the 500 points Russian stock market growth during the 2000-2006 period was attributed to two major energy com--ticipation also increased in industries such as utility, metallurgy and mining, transport and manufacturing (see Table 2 for number of co-partnerships among -ported that the implemented state-private co-partnership had a positive effect on company long-term performance, indicating that this strategy may have been less costly and more effective than simply monitoring and punishing private decision-makers. Chernykh (2005) 
Conclusion
Russia has a long-standing tradition of authoritarian government, where its business model came to rely on a strong governing role of the state. As is often postulated, the historical tendency in Russia for central and authoritarian economic planning hampers the possibilities of any organic growth through the medium of unfettered market forces.
Evidence has shown that under a weak legal system, hierarchical groups tend to adopt a short-term wealth tunneling strategy, which leads to economic stagnastyle governing institutions failed to emerge and the new elites siphoned off national resources.
The subsequent policy was a response to laissez-faire approach of the 1990s, which culminated in economic collapse, institutional chaos, and a weak state. The administration focused on reigning in the oligarchs and centralizing federto ensure that the state's interests are met. Unsurprisingly, these goals came at the expense of the development of more democratic institutions. punishment strategy on private decision-makers, who sought to form competing also important to observe the formation of a substitute monitoring mechanism, where the state aspired to form a direct co-partnership with private investors to promote long-run economic growth.
Putin's strategies to rebuild the Russian state were not dissimilar to the approaches adopted in the 19 th century France and Japan, which centralized power, implementing a top-down control method and displacing the elites. that transition economies may not necessarily remain unstable until they implement democratic institutions, and that their stable state may, in fact, represent the state will successfully manage Russia's faltering economy in the wake of property rights system may still be the necessary prerequisite for the country's long-term development.
